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Abstract
We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing
and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time
complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in parameters that depend on single agent
instead of depending on the size of the joint type space. We use this framework to design
computationally efficient optimal auctions that satisfy ex-post Individual Rationality in the
presence of constraints such as (hard, private) budgets and envy-freeness. We also design optimal
auctions when buyers and a seller’s utility functions are non-linear. Scenarios with such functions
include (a) auctions with “quitting rights”, (b) cost to borrowmoney beyond budget, (c) a seller’s
and buyers’ risk aversion. Finally, we show how our framework also yields optimal auctions for
variety of auction settings considered in [20, 2, 11, 12, 13], albeit with pseudo-polynomial running
times.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a simple framework for designing Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC)
auctions. This model of auction design was pioneered by Myerson [28]. There is a common prior
over the private valuations of all buyers, and the mechanism has to enforce incentive compatibility
in expectation over the revealed types of other buyers (where these types are assumed to be drawn
from the prior), and the randomness introduced by the mechanism. The optimal BIC auction design
problem is purely computational - in most cases, it is possible to design an optimal mechanism in
time polynomial in the support of the joint type space of the priors of all buyers. As the support
can be exponential in the number of buyers, the question arises: Can we design optimal auctions
whose computational complexity is polynomial in the number of buyers, items, and parameters that
only depend on individual buyers? This was first posed as a computational problem in [19].
Though this question was answered in the affirmative in economic literature [28, 9] for simple
settings such as multi-unit auctions, it remained largely open in more general settings. An impres-
sive sequence of recent papers [25, 20, 2, 11, 12, 13] answer this question in the affirmative under
a wide variety of allocation constraints, with both single and multi-dimensional types for each
buyer. These algorithms are based on reducing the revenue maximization problem to a convex
∗University of Pennsylvania. Supported in part by NSF grant IIS-0904314. Email: bhalgat@seas.upenn.edu.
†Microsoft Research Search Labs. Email: sreenivas.gollapudi@microsoft.com.
‡Duke University. Supported by an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, a gift from Cisco, and by NSF via grants
CCF-0745761, CCF-1008065, and IIS-0964560. Part of this work was done while the author was visiting Twitter,
Inc. Email: kamesh@cs.duke.edu.
1
combination over analogous welfare maximization problems on the same allocation constraints via
convex programming techniques, hence reducing an exponential time computation over the joint
type space to polynomial time in the type space of a single buyer.
Our Contributions In this paper, we show that the classical multiplicative weight update
method [33, 31, 3] yields a simple framework for designing optimal auctions along with an ele-
mentary analysis. This framework, presented in Section 5, is based on writing an explicit program
connecting ex-interim variables to ex-post variables (allocations, payments, utilities, etc). It then
reduces the revenue maximization problem to single-bidder optimization problems using the dual
(Lagrangian) variables in the explicit program, hence reducing the running time to depend only on
single-buyer input parameters. Its key advantages stem from the nature of the problem formulation
that explicitly encodes the optimal mechanism’s action in each realization:
• It is extremely simple to state and generalize.
• In contrast with previous techniques, we do not have to argue about feasibility of ex-interim
solutions or explicitly convert them to ex-post allocations. The technique is “one-shot” yield-
ing the mechanism directly from the dual variables.
• The ellipsoid based techniques developed in the previous work are sensitive to the geome-
try of the feasible ex-interim allocation region defined by the separation oracle; when this
region is not convex, such as when the welfare maximization problem can only be solved ap-
proximately [13], the optimization becomes complex. In contrast, the multiplicative weight
update based techniques do not face any such hurdle (as long as the oracle subproblem can
be solved) and yield a relatively simple approach to design mechanisms in such conditions
(see Appendix A.1).
Our approach can be used to derive recent results (mentioned above) on optimal auction design
with multi-dimensional type spaces and allocation constraints [20, 2, 11, 12, 13] (see Appendix A.1),
albeit with running times that are pseudo-polynomial in single-bidder parameters (instead of fully
polynomial). This is however not the main focus of the paper. We focus on designing optimal
mechanisms for several new settings where the only known previous results were approximation
algorithms. Though previous techniques can be adapted to solve these variants, we illustrate how
our technique provides a direct approach to such auction design problems. The settings we consider
involve designing mechanisms for the following scenarios:
• Auctions with hard payment constraints such as budgets;
• Making the BIC mechanism and utility model more robust to the common prior assumption,
by enforcing individual rationality ex-post (in presence of hard payment constraints), and
• Non-linear utility functions for seller and buyers, which includes scenarios such as risk averse
seller and/or buyers, buyers with quitting rights, and cost to borrow money beyond budget.
We discuss these aspects briefly next, before presenting our results.
Ex-post Rationality and Payment Constraints: A criticism of Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
(BIC) is that it is not robust to the common prior assumption on all buyers; in particular, if a
buyer is agnostic to this prior information, the allocations and payments may make no sense to him.
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See for instance [5, 27] for a discussion of this aspect, as well as the discussion implicit in [20]. One
simple constraint to make the mechanism more robust is to ensure that the voluntary participation
(or individual rationality (IR)) constraint always holds: Given a buyer’s revealed type, its allocation
and payment in any outcome of the mechanism yield it non-negative utility for that revealed type.
This is a very intuitive constraint, since a buyer will participate even when he has no knowledge
of the prior. In several settings, a BIC mechanism can indeed be converted into one where this
constraint holds as well. A notable exception to this happens when there are payment constraints
on the buyers.
We consider BIC mechanism design in settings where there are general ex-post constraints
not only on allocations, but also on the payments buyers make. The most important example is
constraints on payments made by individuals, i.e., budget constraints; another example is fairness
constraints on allocations and payments across buyers, such as the popular envy-freeness constraint.
The presence of these ex-post payment constraints reduces the participation risk from an individual
buyer’s perspective and encourages their participation.
Consider for instance the case where buyers have (possibly private) hard budget constraints.
There is a fairly long line of work [16, 17, 26, 9, 30] in economics literature on optimal BIC auctions
with either public or private budget constraints. It was realized early on that budgets make the
problem significantly harder even when they are publicly known. One crucial difference is that in
the presence of payment constraints, a BIC mechanism can be implemented as an all-pay mechanism
where buyers submit payment with bids (regardless of final allocations); this is ex-interim IR, but
cannot be converted to a mechanism that is ex-post IR. As far as we are aware, the design of
optimal auctions with ex-post IR constraints has not been considered in literature before.
Non-linear Utilities: In many auction design problems, the buyer’s utility is not linear in his
allotment or payment. Consider, for example, auctions with quitting rights for buyers [18]. Unlike
the traditional BIC model where the allocations and payments are binding ex-post (so that the
utility is linear in each scenario and only quasi-linear in expectation), in the quitting rights model,
a buyer can decide to not participate (or quit) ex-post, so that the utility is quasi-linear in each
outcome of the mechanism, and hence non-linear. The presence of quitting rights is important for
a mechanism, as in variety of settings, the outcome cannot be legally enforced on buyers and it
remains a buyer’s choice to accept the outcome ex-post.
We also consider a setting where a buyer incurs an arbitrary monotone cost to arrange for
payments beyond his budget [22]; this includes scenarios where a buyer can take a loan for additional
payment, but he incurs an extra cost for the loan set up and the interest. Lastly, we consider risk-
aversion of buyers and the seller [23]. Again, previous techniques do not address such constraints.
Informal Problem Statements and Our Results We present efficient algorithms for optimal
BIC auctions that satisfy ex-post IR in the presence of constraints on both payment and allocation
in fairly general settings. We also design the optimal auctions in many models where buyers have
non-linear utility over allocation and payment.
We assume the buyer’s type is discrete, and there are n buyers and m items. The running
time we obtain are polynomial in the n,m, 1ǫ , and the size of the type space of each buyer. It also
depends polynomially on the ratio of largest to smallest valuations, and the ratio largest to smallest
marginal prior probabilities for a single buyer.
• Multi-unit auction with arbitrary valuations (Section 4): There are m homogeneous items.
Each buyer is associated with an arbitrary valuation function over the number of items, pa-
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rameterized by his type. Each buyer can also have a hard (possibly private) budget constraint,
and we seek ex-post IR mechanisms.
• Non-linear utility functions (Sec. 6): We consider the multi-unit auction setting when the pri-
vate utility of a buyer is an arbitrary function of allocation and payment, which is parametrized
by a discrete type. As special cases, we consider the quitting rights model [18] described above,
as well as the setting where an agent can borrow money at a cost [22]. Finally, we allow the
seller to have utilities on payments received [23, 6]. Our setting allows positive transfers, and
do not need individual rationality as a constraint for optimality (both of which can raise more
utility for a risk-averse seller).
• Multi-item auctions (Appendix A): There are m divisible items (for instance, ad categories in
an adword auction). Each buyer’s type is multi-dimensional but additive across items. Given
any vector of revealed types, the allocations and payments must satisfy an arbitrary set of
polyhedral constraints. As before, each buyer can have (potentially private) hard budget
constraint, and we require IR to hold ex-post.
In the absence of other constraints on allocations and payments, we enforce ex-post envy-
freeness constraints where a buyer should not derive more utility from the allocation and
payment made to another buyer.
• Procurement auctions (Appendix C): The agents have private costs on procuring items. The
utility of the auctioneer is linear in the subset of items he procures. The auctioneer has a
budget constraint on payments. This is a special case of budget feasible mechanisms [32, 4]
with linear utility functions.
We note that all results in this work easily extend when the distributions are correlated, as long
as there is black box access to samples from the joint type space. (See Appendix B for details.)
Finally, though it is not the main point of the paper, we also note that this approach also derives
all recent results on optimal auction design with multi-dimensional type spaces and allocation
constraints [20, 2, 11, 12, 13] (see Section 5 and Appendix A.1), albeit with pseudo-polynomial
running times.
Overview of the Technique The general framework to derive auctions using the multiplicative
weight method is summarized in Section 5. A key ingredient of this framework is to explicitly
encode the mechanisms’s action (allocation and payment for each buyer) in each realization, and
connect them to the set of holistic variables using the linearity of expectation constraints. The
former are exponentially many in number, but are connected to the latter via polynomially many
linearity of expectation constraints. Our main insight is to use the multiplicative weight update (or
Lagrangean) method to decide feasibility of these linearity of expectation constraints, and show that
the oracle sub-problem that this method requires has a very simple structure - it decouples into a
linear program over holistic variables, and into a per sample (or type vector) optimization problem
of a certain form over the mechanism’s action variables. Even though the latter is over exponentially
many type vectors, it can be estimated by solving the per-sample optimization subproblem over
polynomially many samples. The per sample optimization subproblem is problem-specific, yet it is
an easy exercise to decide when this problem will admit to polynomial time solutions. Assuming it
does, the framework yields a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to computer a ǫ-BIC mechanism
that is an additive ǫ approximation to the optimal revenue.
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We note, the classical multiplicative weight update framework [3] looks at the per-constraint
violation by the average-of-all-rounds solution; we require (and establish) a slight generalization to
this framework (see Section 3):
• The framework can handle different linear constraints in each round.
• We consider the average violation of the ith constraint (for each i) by the solution to the
oracle sub-problem for a uniformly chosen round. With this change, the framework no longer
requires the underlying solution space to be convex.
In comparison with previous work, our optimization technique is based on the Lagrangean of an
explicitly written program instead of trying to directly characterize the space of primal interim
allocations rules. Our running times are pseudo-polynomial in the ratio of largest to smallest
marginal prior probabilities. We leave improving this dependence without sacrificing any BIC or
optimality properties as future work.
Related Work Though many auctions implemented in practice incorporate budget constraints
(for instance, ad allocation auctions), most theoretical results in the absence of a Bayesian as-
sumption show impossibility of designing auctions with specific properties. For instance, recent
work [21, 24] shows the impossibility of designing auctions that are Pareto-optimal in terms of
welfare even in multi-unit settings. Furthermore, Nisan [29] show that competitive equilibria need
not exist even when agents have additive valuations for items. The lone exceptions are positive
results for simple multi-unit settings [21, 24, 7, 1] with unlimited supply of the item. In view of
these impossibility results, it is more natural to consider the Bayesian setting; however all results
so far [16, 17, 26, 9, 30, 20, 12] only satisfy individual rationality in expectation over the priors.
We present (what we believe are) the first efficient algorithms for designing optimal auctions that
satisfy individual rationality ex-post in a wide variety of situations.
We finally note that there has been a sequence of recent work on designing approximation
algorithms for auctions in the Bayesian setting. For instance, the results in [14, 8, 7, 15] and sub-
sequent papers show constant factor approximations to optimal auctions under a stronger model
called dominant strategy incentive compatibility; the results in [32, 4] show constant factor ap-
proximations to the welfare of procurement auctions subject to a budget constraint (what they
term budget feasible mechanisms); and the results in [6] considers the seller’s as well as buyers’
risk-aversion. In this paper, our focus is on designing optimal (or near-optimal) auctions and not
on approximation algorithms.
2 Preliminaries
We describe notations used in the paper: There are n buyers and a risk-neutral seller. The type
space for buyer i is Ti, and we denote the individual type of buyer i by ti. We use t to indicate
the vector of reported types of all buyers in a realization of the mechanism. We also abuse the
notation slightly to use ti to indicate buyer i’s type in t. The seller maintains a prior distribution
over the types of the buyers. The probability distribution of buyer i over its type is given by Di
and we use D to indicate the joint distribution over types of all buyers. We use µ(t) to denote the
density of type vector t, and fi(ti) to denote the probability of type ti for buyer i. For exposition of
our results, we assume independence across buyers; however our results easily extend when buyers’
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distributions are correlated (Appendix B). Further, for each auctions setting studied in this work,
we use OPT to denote the expected revenue (or the utility) of the optimal mechanism under the
same set of constraints.
2.1 Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
A mechanism is a mapping from a vector of revealed types (or bids) to a (possibly randomized)
set of allocations and payments for each buyer. For most of this paper, we assume the utility of
a buyer is linear: For any allocation made and payment charged to the buyer, his utility is the
difference between the welfare from the allocation and the payment.
Bayesian (ex-interim) Incentive Compatibility In this model of incentive compatibility, we
assume the prior is common knowledge, and buyers are interested in maximizing their expected
utility, where the expectation is over the types of the other buyers drawn from their respective
priors. More formally, let Ui(t
′
i, ti) denote the expected utility for buyer i when he reveals type t
′
i
and his true type is ti, where this expectation is over the types of the other buyers (drawn from
their prior distributions) and the randomness in the mechanism. A Bayesian Incentive Compatible
(BIC) mechanism has to enforce that:
Incentive Compatibility (IC): Ui(ti, ti) ≥ Ui(t
′
i, ti) for every pair of types ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti, and
Individual Rationality (IR): Ui(ti, ti) ≥ 0 for all types ti ∈ Ti.
A mechanism is said to be ǫ-BIC if it enforces Ui(ti, ti) ≥ Ui(t
′
i, ti) − ǫ for every pair of types
ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti.
Robust (ex-post) Individual Rationality The BIC constraint only requires the allocations
and payments to satisfy IR ex-interim. In this paper, we consider a sub-class of mechanisms that
satisfy a more robust (ex-post) notion of IR: If buyer i reveals type ti, then its allocation and
payment should yield non-negative utility for the reported type in each outcome of the mechanism.
We term this constraint ex-post IR.
Budgets Constraints Each buyer is associated with a budget constraint. The budgets can be
either publicly known, or it is buyer’s private information specified using his type. We denote buyer
i’s budget by Bi, when budgets are public. For private budgets, we use Bi(t) to denote buyer i’s
budget when his type is t. Unless mentioned otherwise, we assume that a buyer’s utility of paying
more than his budget is −∞.
2.2 Problem Statements
In this work, we primarily focus on designing BIC mechanisms that maximize expected revenue
and satisfy IR and budget constraints ex-post.
• Multi-unit Auctions (Section 4): The seller has m identical items, each buyer i is associated
with a publicly known valuation function vi : N × Ti → R
+; his valuation for receiving k
items is vi(k, ti) when his type is ti. We assume that vi(k, ti) ≥ 0 for each k ≥ 0, i, ti ∈ Ti,
and vi(0, ti) = 0 for each i, ti ∈ Ti. We note, these valuations easily capture scenarios where
each buyer wants at most one item.
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• Non-linear Utility (Section 6): Various multi-unit auction settings that involves buyers as
well as the seller with non-linear utility functions are illustrated in Section 6.
• Multi-item Auctions with Divisible Items (Appendix A): The seller offers m distinct types of
divisible items. We assume that buyers have additive valuations: if buyer i of type t receives
xij amount of item j, for each j, then his total valuation of the allocation is
∑
j xijvij(t).
Further, in addition to budget and ex-post IR constraints, we are given a polyope P over the
set of feasible allocation and payments in a realization of the mechanism.
• Budget Feasible Mechanisms: We describe the setting as well as our result in Appendix C.
Running Times We are given a parameter L, that for any single buyer, bounds the absolute
value of (a) his payment, (b) his valuation for any set of items, and (c) his utility (for any allocation
and payment). Further, we assume that fi(t) ≥ 1/L for each i, t ∈ Ti. Our algorithms produce
ǫ-BIC mechanisms that are additive ǫ approximation to revenue in time polynomial in n (#buyers),
m (#items), maxi |Ti|, and the parameters L and 1/ǫ.
3 The Multiplicative Weights Update Framework
In this section, we present a slight generalization to the multiplicative weights update framework
to decide the feasibility of a set of linear constraints over arbitrary spaces. We note its difference
compared to the classical framework:
• The framework can (and needs to) handle different linear constraints in each round.
• We consider the average violation of the ith constraint (for each i) by the solution to the
oracle sub-problem for a uniformly chosen round (instead of the violation by the average
solution of all rounds). With this change, the framework no longer requires the underlying
solution space to be convex (Observation 1).
We next illustrate the framework using the exposition and bounds due to [3]. We first define the
generic problem to decide the feasibility of linear constraints: Given an arbitrary set P ∈ Rs, and
an r × s matrix A,
LP(A, b, P ): ∃x ∈ P such that Ax ≥ b?
The running time of the algorithm is quantified in terms of the Width defined as:
ρ = max
i
max
x∈P
|aix− bi|
The algorithm assumes an efficient oracle of the form: Let y ≥ 0 be an r dimensional dual vector.
Oracle(A, y): Solve C(A, y) = max{ytAz : z ∈ P}.
We now describe a generalization of the Arora-Hazan-Kale (AHK) procedure that allows the
matrix A and vector b to be different in each step, albeit with the same number of rows r, and same
width bound ρ. Denote the matrix at time t to be At, and its i
th row by ait; denote the vector b
at time t to be bt.
The following theorem follows by simply re-working the analysis in [3], we omit its proof.
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Algorithm 1 Generalized AHK Algorithm
Let K ← 4ρ
2 log r
ǫ2
; y1 = 1
for t = 1 to K do
Find xt using Oracle(At, yt).
if C(At, yt) < y
T
t bt then
Declare LP(At, bt, P ) infeasible and terminate.
end if
For i = 1, 2, . . . , r, set Mit = aitxt − bit .
Update yit+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , r as follows:
yit+1 ← yit(1− ǫ)
Mit/ρ if Mit ≥ 0.
yit+1 ← yit(1 + ǫ)
−Mit/ρ if Mit < 0.
Optional step: Normalize yt+1 to have unit l1-norm.
end for
Return (x1, x2, . . . , xK).
Theorem 3.1. If for all t, LP(At, bt, P ) is feasible, the procedure never declares infeasibility, and
the sequence (x1, x2, . . . , xK) satisfies:∑
t(aitxt − bit)
K
+ ǫ ≥ 0 ∀i
Observation 1. If P is convex and (At, bt) are the same for all t, then x
∗ = (
∑
t xt)/K is a
feasible solution with Ax∗ ≥ b− ǫ1. Further, even if P is not convex, the procedure is well-defined
and we can interpret x∗ as choosing one of the xt uniformly at random from {x1, x2, . . . , xK}.
4 Multi-unit Auctions
In this section, we describe a framework for designing mechanisms by the multiplicative weight
update method using multi-unit auctions as an example. We generalize this example to a structural
framework in Section 5, and present more instantiations of this framework in later sections. We
begin by the case where valuations of different buyers are independent, the only feasibility constraint
is on the supply of items, and i.e. at most m items can be allocated, each buyer is associated with
a public budget constraint, and the objective is to design an ǫ-BIC mechanism that is (a) feasible,
(b) ex-post IR, and (c) satisfies the budget constraints in each realization. The technique to handle
private budgets is explained in Section 4.3.
The following theorem states our result for multi-unit auctions:
Theorem 4.1. For multi-unit auctions with per buyer budget constraints, there exists a polynomial
time algorithm to compute a mechanism that is ex-post IR, ǫ-BIC, and is an ǫ-approximation to
the revenue of the optimal mechanism (under the same set of constraints).
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 4.1. Consider a realization of the mechanism, let
t be the reported type vector of all buyers. In the realization, let xiq(t) ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator
variable indicating whether buyer i is allocated q ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} items when the reported type
vector is t. Let pi(t) be the payment made by buyer i. As vector x(t),p(t) must be feasible, it
should satisfy the constraints F(t) shown below.
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∑
i qxi,q(t) ≤ m∑
q vi(q, ti)xiq(t) ≥ pi(t) ∀i, q
xiq(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, q∑
q xiq = 1 ∀i
pi(t) ∈ [0, Bi] ∀i
Let Xiq(ti) be the probability that buyer i is allocated q items when his reported type is ti, and let
Pi(ti) be his expected payment when his type is ti. This probability is over the randomness due to
the other buyers’ valuations, and due to the randomness in the mechanism. We get
fi(ti)Xiq(ti) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xiq(t) ∀i, q, ti ∈ Ti (1)
fi(ti)Pi(ti) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)pi(t) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti (2)
The BIC constraint is the following: ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti,∑
q
vi(q, ti)Xiq(ti)− Pi(ti) ≥
∑
q
vi(q, ti)Xiq(t
′
i)− Pi(t
′
i) (3)
Further, we add a constraint to check whether revenue OPT is feasible. This can be written as the
constraint: ∑
i,ti∈Ti
fi(ti)Pi(ti) ≥ OPT (4)
Randomized Mechanisms An astute reader will object that the set F(t) only captures the
space of deterministic mechanisms and an optimal mechanism can take a randomized action for
type vector t. To capture randomized mechanisms, we have to replace F(t) with the convex hull of
the set F(t). However, this will only be a technicality - the multiplicative weight update framework
described below optimizes a linear function of {x(t), p(t)} over this set, and this optimization
problem is clearly the same whether we use F(t) or its convex hull. Since the same observation can
be made of all the problems considered in this paper, we will use F(t) for expositional simplicity.
4.1 Structural Characterization
We define the set of feasibility constraints C as the set of constraints F(t) for all type vectors
t, combined with the BIC constraint (3) and the revenue constraint Eq (4). Consider deciding
feasibility of Equations 1 and 2 subject to the constraints C. This is equivalent to deciding the
feasibility of following constraints, referred to as EQ:
Xiq(ti) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xiq(t)/fi(ti) ∀i, q, ti ∈ Ti
Pi(ti) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)pi(t)/fi(ti) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
Using the multiplicative weight method, the feasibility problem reduces to a sequence ofOracle(α, β)
problems, where αiqti , βiti (1 ≤ i ≤ n, q ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, ti ∈ Ti) are the dual multipliers which could
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be positive or negative (as the constraints are equality constraints). Oracle(α, β) asks us to solve,
for α, β:
Max −
∑
i,ti∈Ti
fi(ti)
(∑
q αiqtiXiq(ti) + βitiPi(ti)
)
+
∑
t
µ(t)
(∑
i
(∑
q(αiqtixiq(t)) + βitipi(t)
))
subject to the following constraints:∑
q vi(q, ti)Xiq(ti)− Pi(ti) ≥
∑
q vi(q, ti)Xiq(t
′
i)− Pi(t
′
i) ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti∑
i,ti∈Ti
fi(ti)Pi(ti) ≥ OPT
{xiq(t)} ∈ F(t) ∀t
Decoupling of the Oracle Note that Oracle(α, β) separates into two optimization problems.
The first is the poly-size linear program LPexp:
Minimize
∑
i,ti∈Ti
fi(ti)
(∑
q
αiqtiXiq(ti) + βitiPi(ti)
)
subject to the following constraints:∑
q vi(q, ti)Xiq(ti)− Pi(ti) ≥
∑
q vi(q, ti)Xiq(t
′
i)− Pi(t
′
i) ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti∑
i,ti∈Ti
fi(ti)Pi(ti) ≥ OPT
The second is the problem A(α, β), which for every type vector t, solves the following problem:
Maximize
∑
i
(∑
q
αiqtixiq(t)
)
+ βitipi(t)
subject to the constraints F(t).
Solving the Problem A(α, β) Now we give a poly-time algorithm to solve the problem A(α, β).
Observe that, in an optimal assignment, if buyer i is given q items, then (a) βiti ≤ 0 ⇒ pi(t) = 0,
and (b) βiti > 0⇒ pi(t) = min{Bi, vi(q, ti)}.
The allocation problem can be solved using dynamic programming as follows: Process buyers
in order n to 1. Let A[i, k] be the value of A(α, β) considering buyers i though n and k items. The
values of A[i, k] can be computed as follows:
A[i, k] = min0≤j≤k(A[i+ 1, k − j] + j × αijtiF +max{βiti ×min{Bi, vi(j, ti)}, 0})
As we shall see later, we will require the algorithm to break ties consistently; this can always be
achieved by having a state-less implementation of the algorithm.
Using Multiplicative Weight Update Framework Now we setup the parameters for the
multiplicative weight update framework. Recall that L is the largest possible welfare a single buyer
can receive from any allocation. Further, L also upper bounds individual buyer’s budgets. Then,
the width of each equality constraint (EQ) is bounded by max{n,L} = L. As maxi |Ti| ≤ L, the
number of constraints in EQ are bounded by 2nmL. Further, the minimum support for any type
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for a buyer is bounded by 1/L. Given any ǫ > 0, choose δ = ǫ/(nmL) and K = O
(
L2 log(nmL)
δ2
)
;
let (α1, β1), (α2, β2), . . . , (αK , βK) be the dual variables in rounds 1, . . . ,K associated with the
multiplicative weight update process. Our mechanism M (α[1 . . . K], β[1 . . . K]) is defined below;
Lemma 4.3 establishes its important properties.
Definition 4.2. Let t be the reported type vector. The mechanismM (α[1 . . . K], β[1 . . . K]) chooses
an integer ℓ between 1 and K uniformly at random, and solves the problem A(αℓ, βℓ) for type vector
t. It then executes allocations and payments according to the solution of A(αℓ, βℓ).
Lemma 4.3. (a) The mechanism M (α[1 . . . K], β[1 . . . K]) is ǫ-BIC, ex-post IR, (b) a buyer never
pays more than his budget, and (c) its expected revenue is at least OPT− ǫ.
Proof. Using the properties of the multiplicative update framework, Equations 1, and 2 are violated
by at most ǫ/(nL). Since maxi,q,ti∈Ti vi(q, ti) ≤ L, the error in each BIC constraint is bounded by
ǫ/n. Further, the error in the revenue equation is bounded by ǫ as maxi,ti∈Ti Pi(ti) ≤ L. This
completes the proof of the lemma.
The only remaining issue is to compute the values of the dual variables efficiently; computing
them exactly will require time Πi|Ti| which is exponential in n.
4.2 Efficient Computation via Sampling
The main hurdle in running multiplicative update framework is that each constraint in EQ is over
exponentially many variables. We relax each constraint in EQ by δ = ǫnmL . The relaxed constraints
are
Xiq(ti) ∈
∑
t|t∈t µ(t)xiq(t)
fi(ti)
± δ ∀i, q, ti ∈ Ti (5)
Pi(ti) ∈
∑
t|t∈t µ(t)pi(t)
fi(ti)
± δ ∀i, ti ∈ Ti (6)
If the relaxed constraints are feasible (with respect to feasibility constraints C), then it is easy to
check that this implies that the BIC constraints are satisfied to an additive ǫ, and the revenue
generated is at least OPT− ǫ. Further, note that the width of each of relaxed constraint is bounded
by ρ = mL. We apply the multiplicative weight update method as follows: In each round ℓ, given
dual weights (αℓ, βℓ), we do the following. Generate C = O(nmL3 log(nmLK)/ǫ) samples from
D; let Sℓ be this set. Let Sitiℓ ⊂ Sℓ be the set of samples in which buyer i has type ti ∈ Ti. We
consider relaxed and sampled version of constraints EQ:
Xiq(ti) ∈
∑
t∈Sitiℓ
xiq(t)
|Sitiℓ|
± δ ∀i, q, ti ∈ Ti
Pi(ti) ∈
∑
t∈Sitiℓ
pi(t)
|Sitiℓ|
± δ ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
We now apply the Oracle to these relaxed constraints using the dual weight vector
(
αℓ, βℓ
)
.
We make a crucial observation:
Observation 2. The function Oracle reduces to solving A(αℓ, βℓ) on these samples.
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We now establish the correctness of our procedure. Let LP(D) be the feasibility problem (con-
straints C and EQ) defined on distribution D and let LP(Sℓ) for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ K be the feasibility problem
defined on Sℓ, where constraints in EQ are relaxed by δ. We focus on the allocation constraints;
the analysis for payment constraints is similar. Let {xℓiq(t)} denote the solution to the Oracle on
LP(Sℓ). Let {x
∗
iq(t)} denote the feasible solution for LP(D) with no slack.
Lemma 4.4. With high probability (≥ 1− 1/poly(nmLK/ǫ)), for all 1 ≤ l ≤ K, we have:∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t∈Sitiℓ
xℓiq(t)
|Sitiℓ|
−
∑
t∈D|ti∈t
µ(t)xℓiq(t)
fi(ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t∈Sitiℓ
x∗iq(t)
|Sitiℓ|
−
∑
t∈D|ti∈t
µ(t)x∗iq(t)
fi(ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
Proof. Since we assumed fi(ti) ≥ 1/L, using Hoeffdings’s bounds and union bound, the probability
that, for each i, ti ∈ Ti, ℓ, |Sitiℓ| ∈ (1±ǫ)C×fi(ti) is 1−poly(nmLK/ǫ). Thus |Sitiℓ| = Ω(nmL
2K/ǫ)
for each i, t ∈ Ti,K.
We now prove the first part. The value of xℓiq(t) is determined by the values of dual variables
αℓ, βℓ. From the previous observation, the Oracle decomposes into solving A(αℓ, βℓ) on individual
samples. The values of xiq(t) for different values of t can be seen as a distribution parameterized
by αℓ, βℓ, and since the set Sℓ is chosen independent of previous rounds and of α
ℓ, βℓ, the process
of drawing type vectors for Sℓ can be seen as drawing independent samples from this distribution.
As each xiq(t) ∈ {0, 1} (i.e. a bounded random variable), we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality and
union bound to prove the first part.
For the second part, note x∗iq(t) ∈ {0, 1}, and the process of sampling valuation vectors t
corresponds to sampling from distribution {x∗iq}. The proof now follows using Hoeffding’s inequality
and union bound.
As a corollary, suppose LP(D) is feasible without any slack, then LP(Sℓ) is feasible for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ K
with high probability (≥ 1 − 1/poly(nmLK/ǫ)). This implies that the Oracle will not return
infeasibility w.h.p.
To establish the correctness, it remains to bound the error in each constraint when the samples
are drawn from D and M(α[1, . . . ,K], β[1, . . . ,K]) is used determine allocations and payments.
We focus on one constraint:∑
t∈Sitiℓ
xiq(t)
|Sitiℓ|
−Xiq(ti) ≥ −δ ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
Using Theorem 3.1, we get
1
K
×
∑
1≤ℓ≤K
(∑
t∈Sitiℓ
xℓiq(t)
|Sitiℓ|
−Xℓiq(ti)
)
≥ −δ − δ
where xℓiq(t) denotes whether in round ℓ, buyer i is given q items when the type vector is t. Applying
Lemma 4.4 once again, we have:
∑
1≤ℓ≤K
∑
t∈D|ti∈t
µ(t)xℓiq(t)/fi(ti)−X
ℓ
iq(ti)
K
≥ −3δ
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Rearranging, we obtain:
∑
t∈D|ti∈t
µ(t)
fi(ti)
×
∑
1≤ℓ≤K
xℓiq(t)
K
−
∑
1≤ℓ≤K
Xℓiq(ti)
K
≥ −3δ
This shows that if round ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} is chosen uniformly at random and its allocation and
payment according to mechanism A(αℓ, βℓ) are used, this yields a ǫ-BIC mechanism with revenue
OPT− ǫ.
4.3 Handling Private Budgets
Next, we illustrate how to extend our techniques when buyers’ budgets are private and specified
through the reported types. Recall that Bi(ti) denotes buyer i’s budget when his reported type
is ti. Under the assumption that, the utility of paying more than the budget is −∞ for buyer,
we offer all items to an arbitrarily chosen buyer with a vanishingly small probability; otherwise
we run the mechanism M (α[1 . . . T ], β[1 . . . T ]). In such case, buyer i never reports type t′i with
Bi(t
′
i) > Bi(ti) when his real type is ti. Now the BIC constraint changes to∑
q vi(q, ti)Xiq(ti)− Pi(ti) ≥
∑
q vi(q, ti)Xi(t
′
i)− Pi(t
′
i)
∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti with Bi(ti) ≥ Bi(t
′
i)
Thus, in-spite of having utility of −∞ for paying more than the budget, the width of the LP does
not increase and we can use techniques developed in the earlier part of this section to develop an
ǫ-BIC, ex-post IR mechanism.
5 Overall Framework for Optimal Auction Design
We next summarize the generic framework for mechanism design using the multiplicative weight
update method. There are two sets of variables:
• Action Variables: For each type vector t, xi(t) and pi(t) indicates the mechanism’s allocation
and payment for buyer i. As discussed earlier, the optimal mechanism can take a randomized
action for a type vector t; it does not affect the analysis of the framework.
• Holistic Variables: For buyer i, each ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti, Ui(ti, t
′
i) indicates the average utility for
reporting type ti when the real type is t
′
i. Further, Pi(ti, t
′
i) is his average payment for
reported type ti when the real type is t
′
i.
There are three sets of constraints:
• F(t): the feasible set of actions for type vector t. In each realization, 〈x(t),p(t)〉 ∈ F(t).
• EQ: the set of constraints that connect action variables to holistic variables. This connection
is problem specific, we illustrate its generic structure.
For buyer i and a reported type vector t, where ti ∈ t is his reported type, let ui(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t))
and hi(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t)) be his utility and payment when t
′
i is his real type and 〈xi(t), pi(t)〉
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are the mechanism’s action variables. Then the constraints for buyer i are
Ui(ti, t
′
i) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)
fi(ti)
ui(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t))
Pi(ti, t
′
i) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)
fi(ti)
hi(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t))
• Linear constraints on holistic variables such as BIC, revenue, and other ex-interim constraints.
Each equation in EQ plays the role of an expert in the multiplicative weight update framework.
The oracle problem Oracle(αℓ, βℓ) in round ℓ asks us to solve, for dual multipliers αℓ, βℓ, the
following:
Maximize
∑
t
(
µ(t)×
∑
i,t′i∈Ti
(
αℓitit′i
ui(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t)) + β
ℓ
itit′i
hi(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t))
))
subject to constraint F(t) for each t. The optimization problem A(αℓ, βℓ) for type vector t maxi-
mizes, subject to constraint F(t), the quantity
∑
i,t′
i
∈Ti
(
αℓitit′i
ui(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t)) + β
ℓ
itit′i
hi(tti∈t, t
′
i, xi(t), pi(t))
)
Let ALG be the algorithm that can solve this problem optimally. Then, as established in Section 4,
it suffices to solve A(α, β) for C samples of type vectors drawn from the joint distribution; C =
poly(n,m,
∑
i |Ti|, 1/ǫ, L). The dual multipliers
(
αℓ+1, βℓ+1
)
are computed based on the error in
each constraint in round ℓ. The process is repeatedK = poly(n,
∑
i |Ti|, 1/ǫ, L) times; this generates
K sets of dual variables
(
(α1, β1), (α2, β2), . . . , (αK , βK)
)
. The eventual mechanism is as follows:
for reported type vector t, pick a round at random, say ℓ, and solve the optimization problem
A(αℓ, βℓ) for type vector t.
In general, a main hurdle to achieving tractability is that the Lagrange multipliers, α, β can
be negative. We note, in many cases the full generality of the framework is not needed: We can
eliminate several variables, and the constraints EQ as well as the holistic variables can take a simple
form that is more tractable.
We present instantiations of this framework for multi-item auctions next. The key point is
the following: As long as the Oracle subproblem constructed above is polynomial time solvable or
admits to an approximation algorithm, the entire framework yields a polynomial time algorithm, or
a similar approximation guarantee.
Multi-item Auctions and Tractability It is quite straightforward to extend the above frame-
work to multi-dimensional auctions. We discuss the case with budgets and other ex-post IR con-
straints such as envy-freeness in Appendix A, and we only summarize it below. The action variables
are xij(t), which denotes whether item j allocated to buyer i when the buyers’ type vector is t;
and pi(t), which is the price paid by buyer i. For any t, the allocation and payments must be
feasible for a set of allocation and IR constraints, denoted by F(t). The holistic variables are Xijti ,
denoting the expected allocation of item j to buyer i when his type is ti, and Piti denoting the
expected price paid. When a buyer’s welfare is linear in the valuations for different items, the BIC
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constraints are linear in the holistic variables. The overall problem reduces to checking feasibility
of constraints
fi(ti)Xijti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xij(t) ∀i, j, ti ∈ Ti
fi(ti)Piti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)pi(t) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
In Appendix A, we show that when the items are divisible, the agent’s utilities are linear, and
the set of feasible allocations is convex, the Oracle problem remains tractable even with private
ex-post budgets and other IR constraints.
We note, if there are no ex-post constraints on payments (setting in [20, 12, 13]), the only
action variables capture allocations for each buyer given the joint type revealed, so that F(t) is
simply the space of feasible allocations. The constraints EQ relate these per-scenario allocation
variables to the expected allocations for each buyer given his type. Since there are no per-scenario
payment constraints, the holistic payment variables are only present in the BIC and ex-interim IR
constraints, and do not need corresponding action variables. Furthermore, when the allocation sets
are downward closed, it is easy to show that the constraints EQ can now be written as inequality
constraints instead of equality as follows.
fi(ti)Xijti ≤
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xij(t) ∀i, j, ti ∈ Ti
The advantage of doing this is that it makes the Oracle subproblem have non-negative Lagrange
multipliers, which makes the subproblem equivalent to welfare maximization over the feasible allo-
cation space. We sketch in Appendix A.1 how this approach derives the results for approximately
optimal auctions over downward closed allocation spaces presented in [13].
6 Non-Linear Utility Functions
In this section, we consider multi-unit auctions (with budgets) when agents have non-linear utility
functions. We first consider two well studied special cases of buyers with non-linear utility function
over allocation and payment, namely (a) auction with quitting rights and (b) the soft budget
constraint with cost to borrow. We also address a general setting in which the seller has a non-
linear utility function over revenue and buyers have arbitrary utility functions over allocations and
payments (which includes scenarios such as buyers’ and/or seller’s risk-aversion).
6.1 Auctions with Quitting Rights
We first consider a model of auctions with quitting rights [18]: The outcome of the mechanism is
not binding on the buyer, and in each realization of the mechanism, the buyer has the option to
quit if his payment is more than his valuation of the allocated set. In other words, in each outcome,
his utility is the maximum of zero and the difference in his welfare and payment. We note, even
though the ex-post IR constraint makes a buyer’s utility non-negative for the correctly reported
type, the non-binding nature of contract makes utility non-negative even for mis-reporting the type.
This makes the BIC constraint non-linear in the expected allocations and payments, and a buyer’s
expected utility for each type needs to be computed explicitly.
As before, consider a realization of the mechanism, let t be the reported type vector of all
buyers. In the realization, let xiq(t) ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator variable indicating whether buyer i
is allocated q ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} items when the reported type vector is t. Let pi(t) be the payment
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made by buyer i. The variables should satisfy the constraints F(t) below.∑
i qxi,q(t) ≤ m∑
q vi(q, ti)xiq(t)− pi(t) ≥ 0 ∀i
xiq(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, q∑
q xiq = 1 ∀i
pi(t) ∈ [0, Bi] ∀i
Let Ui(ti, t
′
i) be buyer i’s expected utility when his reported type is ti and the real type is t
′
i. We
get, ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti
Ui(ti, t
′
i) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)
fi(ti)
(
max
{∑
q
viq(t
′
i)xiq(t)− pi(t), 0
})
(Recall, we denote buyer i’s reported type in t by ti.) The BIC constraint is the following:
Ui(ti, ti) ≥ Ui(t
′
i, ti) ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti
We add the revenue constraints:∑
i,ti
fi(ti)Pi(ti) ≥ OPT
fi(ti)Pi(ti) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)pi(t) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
We discuss the correctness of the revenue constraints: as the mechanism is always individual rational
for the reported type, the revenue from buyer i for type vector t is pi(t), when he reports his type
truthfully. TheOracle problem A(α, β), which for every type vector t, solves the following subject
to constraints F(t):
Maximize
∑
it′i
αitit′i
(
max
{∑
q vi(q, t
′
i)xiq(t)− pi(t), 0
})
+
∑
i βitipi(t)
For any type vector t, this can be solved using dynamic programming: if q items are allocated to
buyer i then the payment is uniquely determined as follows:
(a) If βiti ≤ 0, then pi(t) = 0
(b) If βiti > 0, then pi(t) is the price that maximizes∑
t′i
αitit′i
(
max{
∑
q vi(q, t
′
i)xiq(t)− pi(t), 0}
)
. Its value lies in the set {0, Bi} ∪ {vi(q, t
′
i)|t
′
i ∈ Ti}
and can be computed in polynomial time. This implies a poly-time dynamic program analogous to
that in Section 4. We get the following theorem using multiplicative weight update method.
Theorem 6.1. For multi-unit auctions with quitting rights and budget constraints, there exists a
polynomial time algorithm to compute an ǫ-BIC mechanism with revenue OPT− ǫ.
6.2 Soft Budget Constraints
Until now, we have assumed that buyers have fixed budgets and cannot pay more than their budgets.
Recently, models with soft budgets have been considered assuming a buyer’s ability to borrow at an
additional cost [22]. The model is formally defined as follows: buyer i is associated with a piecewise
linear function ci : R → R; ci(p) denotes the total cost for arranging payment p and we assume
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that ci(p)− p is monotone. For instance, if buyer i can arrange for interest-free Bi dollars, and has
to pay an interest rate of r beyond that; then ci(p) = p+max{(1 + r)× (p−Bi), 0}. The function
ci easily accounts for situations where (a) there is an additional fixed cost to setup the loan, and
(b) the total interest amount increases with the amount of the loan.
The buyer’s utility in a realization is his valuation of the allocated items minus the cost for his
payment. The details are similar to the previous setting, we note the differences. The function
U(ti, t
′
i) changes to
fi(ti)Ui(ti, t
′
i) =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)
(∑
q vi(q, t
′
i)xiq(t)− ci(pi(t))
)
The additional constraint in F(t) is the IR constraint that the mechanism is rational for the
reported type: ∑
q vi(q, ti)xiq(t)− ci(p(t)) ≥ 0
As before, for each type vector t, the Oracle solves the following subject to constraints F(t):
Maximize
∑
it′i
αitit′i
(∑
q vi(q, t
′
i)xiq(t)− ci(pi(t))
)
The optimal solution has the following property: if q items are allocated to buyer i, then his
payment within the set {0, vi(q, ti)} and among the end points of the linear pieces of ci(p). Thus
the optimal assignment can be found using dynamic programming and an ǫ-BIC mechanism can
be designed using the multiplicative update framework.
6.3 Non Linear Utility for Seller
The settings considered until now assume that the seller’s utility is linear in revenue and the
objective is to maximize his expected revenue. In this section, we address the setting in which the
seller is associated with an arbitrary monotone utility function U : R → R; i.e. the seller’s utility
for revenue Z is U(Z). The objective of the mechanism is to maximize the seller’s expected utility
EZ [U(Z)]. Further, each buyer i is associated with an arbitrary utility function ui : Z ×N ×Ti →
R+; buyer i’s utility for receiving q items for a payment of p is ui(p, q, ti) where ti is his type. This
includes scenarios where the seller and/or the buyers are risk averse.
We make following assumptions on the nature of utility functions, as well as on the optimal
mechanism: (a) a buyer’s payment is allowed to be negative (positive transfer is allowed) however
the set of possible payments from a buyer is restricted to integers between −L and L, (b) for each
i, ti ∈ Ti, p, q, |ui(p, q, ti)| ≤ L, and (c) U(0) = 0.
The assumption about integral payments is for simplicity in exposition; if all buyers’ and seller’s
utility functions are monotone and have bounded derivative, then any BIC mechanism can be
converted into an ǫ-BIC mechanism whose payments are integral - we simply round down the
payment to a suitably discretized value so that the utility does not change by more than ǫ. The
reason we allow positive transfers in the above framework is that it can raise much more utility for
the seller (see [6] for details).
In the optimal mechanism, let xipq(t) be an indicator variable that denote whether buyer i is
given q items for a payment of p when buyers’ type vector is t. For any t, allocation and payments
must be feasible for the following set of constraints F(t), where the final constraint imposes ex-post
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IR: ∑
i,p,q qxipq(t) ≤ m∑
p,q xipq(t) = 1 ∀i
xipq(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, p, q
xipq(t) = 0 ∀i, p, q s.t. ui(p, q, ti) < 0
Let Xipq(ti) denote the probability that buyer i is allocated q items at price p when his revealed
type is ti. The problem reduces to checking the feasibly of the following set of constraints
fi(ti)Xipq(ti)−
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xipq(t) = 0 ∀i, ti ∈ Ti, p, q∑
t
µ(t)U
(∑
i,p,q p× xipq(t)
)
≥ R
subject to constraints given by F(t) (for all type vectors t) and the BIC constraint given below:∑
p,q (Xipq(ti)−Xipq(t
′
i))× ui(p, q, ti) ≥ 0 ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti
As before, the Oracle problem A(α, β), for each type vector t, solves the following
Max
(∑
i,p,q,ti∈t
αipqtixipq(t) + β ×U
(∑
i,p,q p× xipq(t)
))
subject to constraints F(t). We note that αipqt can be both positive or negative, however β is
always positive.
Solving A(α, β) for t: The problem can be solved optimally using a dynamic program as follows:
let A(i, k, z) be the maximum value of the objective function when k items are allocated to first i
buyers generating a total revenue of z from them. The recurrence relation for the dynamic program
is
A(i, k, z) = minq≤m−kmaxp{β × (U(z + p)− U(z)) +A(i+ 1, k + q, z + p) + αipqti}
Note, our assumption that payments to buyers are always integral and bounded between −L and
+L. Thus, A(∗, ∗, z) needs to defined only for 2nL different values of revenue, and the dynamic
program can be solved in time polynomial in L. Using the multiplicative weight update framework,
we get following theorem:
Theorem 6.2. Given a seller with arbitrary utility function over total revenue and buyers with
arbitrary utility functions over payments and allocations, there exists a polynomial time algorithm
to compute an ǫ-BIC mechanism with expected utility OPT− ǫ for the seller.
We note that if we only wish to impose ex-interim IR, then we remove the final constraint in
F(t), and instead add: ∑
p,qXipq(ti)× ui(p, q, ti) ≥ 0 ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
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A Multi-item Auctions
In this section, we illustrate how to use our framework for multi-item auctions, when buyers have
additive valuations and items are divisible. The setting is described in detail in Section 2. As
earlier, the objective is to design an ǫ-BIC mechanism that is feasible, ex-post IR, satisfies buyers’
budget constraints, and maximizes seller’s revenue. For simplicity in exposition, we assume that
buyers’ budgets are public; our techniques can be easily extended to handle private budgets. The
technically interesting aspect is that we can write constraints coupling allocations and payments
across buyers, for instance envy-freeness constraints. At the end, in Section A.1, we show that our
framework provides a simple recipe for deriving recent results in [20, 12, 13] for general allocation
constraints.
In the mechanism, let xij(t) denote the fraction of item j allocated to buyer i when the buyers’
type vector is t; and let pi(t) be the price paid by buyer i. For any t, the allocation and payments
must be feasible for the following convex set of constraints, denoted by F(t):
x(t),p(t) ∈ P(t) and pi(t) ≤ Bi ∀i and∑
j
vij(ti)xij(t) ≥ pi(t) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
Let Xijti denote the expected allocation of item j to buyer i when his type is ti and let Piti denote
the expected price paid. For target revenue OPT, the problem reduces to checking feasibility of
constraints:
fi(ti)Xijti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xij(t) ∀i, j, ti ∈ Ti
fi(ti)Piti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)pi(t) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
subject to the constraints given by F(t) for all t and:∑
j vij(ti)Xijti − Piti ≥
∑
j vij(ti)Xijt′i − Pit′i ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti∑
i,t fi(ti)Piti ≥ OPT
We use techniques developed in Section 4 to solve the feasibility problem. As before, it would
require implementation of Oracle(α, β) that reduces to solving A(α, β), which for each type
vector t, computes:
Maximize
∑
i,j
αijtixij(t) +
∑
i
βitipi(t)
subject to the constraints F(t). As F(t) is convex, A(α, β) can be solved optimally using an LP
for any t. Thus we get the following theorem:
Theorem A.1. For multi-item auctions with additive valuations and arbitrary convex constraints
on the set of feasible allocations an payment in any realization, there exists a polynomial time
algorithm to compute a feasible, ex-post rational, ǫ-BIC mechanism with expected revenue OPT− ǫ.
Envy-Freeness The techniques in this section can be extended to support envy-freeness in each
realization of the mechanism. Consider the setting where F(t) only has the ex-post IR constraints
x(t),p(t) ≥ 0 and
∑
j
vij(ti)xij(t) ≥ pi(t) ∀i
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Envy-freeness means that no buyer receives more utility from the allocation and payment made to
another buyer. We can enforce this by simply adding∑
j
xij(t)vij(ti)− pi(t) ≥
∑
j
xi′j(t)vij(ti)− pi′(t) ∀i, i
′
to F(t). Note, F(t) still remains convex and A(α, β) can be solved in polynomial time.
Our auctions extend to the case where there are m = O(1) indivisible items. The valuation to
buyer i for obtaining subset S of items given type t is vi(S, t).
A.1 General Allocation Constraints
For multi-dimensional auctions without ex-post IR or payment constraints, our approach can handle
general allocation constraints (over indivisible items) as considered in [20, 12, 13]. We illustrate
this for the multi-item auction problem with additive valuations and indivisible items, where the
allocation set F(t) = {x(t) ∈ P} is downward closed and only admits to c-approximately optimizing
welfare [13]. The key hurdle with applying the above methodology as is, is that the dual multipliers
can be negative. But this is easy to fix: Since we do not have payment constraints, we simply need
to check the feasibility of the following inequality constraint:
fi(ti)Xijti ≤
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xij(t) ∀i, j, ti
subject to the constraints given by F(t) for all t and the BIC, ex-interim IR, and revenue constraints
on {Xijt, Pit}.
Consider a relaxed feasibility problem for c ≥ 1:
fi(ti)Xijti ≤ c×
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xij(t) ∀i, j, ti
The Oracle(α) problem maximizes welfare,
∑
i,j αijtixij(t) subject to F(t). Since the constraint
is inequality, we have α ≥ 0 so that the Oracle sub-problem is precisely welfare maximization.
Suppose this has a c approximation. Suppose there is a feasible solution to the original program of
the following form
fi(ti)X
∗
ijti
≤
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)x∗ij(t) ∀i, j, ti
Then, we must have: ∑
i,j,ti
αijtifi(ti)X
∗
ijti
≤
∑
i,j,ti
αijti
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)x∗ij(t)
Since Oracle(α) has a c-approximation, there exists a solution x˜ that can be computed in poly-
nomial time such that:∑
i,j,ti
αijtifi(ti)X
∗
ijti
≤ c×
∑
i,j,ti
αijti
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)x˜ij(t)
This implies that the multiplicative weight update method using the c-approximate oracle will
never declare infeasibility of the relaxed program. The rest of the argument is the same as before,
and yields a randomized mechanism using the multiplicative weight method.
The only issue is in making the final mechanism obey the BIC constraints since the inequality
constraint implies the probability of allocation need not be exactly Xijti in expectation, and could
be larger. The fix is however a standard trick that works for downward closed environments.
Suppose the final slack in the constraint for (i, j, ti), that is, the ratio of LHS to RHS, is βijti ≤ 1,
then whenever the mechanism decides to allocate item j to buyer i for type ti, we allocate with
probability βijti . This ensures the expected allocation is exactly Xijti/c. If the charge exactly Pit/c
via an all-pay scheme, then this ensures that the mechanism is BIC with revenue OPT/c.
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B Correlated Distributions
In this section, we illustrate how to extend our techniques to handle correlated distributions for
multi-unit auctions. Our techniques are generic and easily extend to other settings considered in
the paper. Note, in Section 4, the BIC constraint of multi-unit auctions is stated as∑
q vi(q, ti)Xiq(ti)− Pi(ti) ≥
∑
q vi(q, ti)Xiq(t
′
i)− Pi(t
′
i)
∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti
where Xiqti and Piti are defined as
fi(ti)Xiqti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xiq(t) ∀i, q, ti ∈ Ti
fi(ti)Piti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)pi(t) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
The BIC constraint stated above requires independence across buyers. With correlated distribu-
tions, if buyer i’s real type is ti and his reported type is t
′
i, then the probability that he is allocated
q items is not necessarily Xiq(t
′
i); same holds for expected payments. With correlated distributions,
these values need to computed explicitly. Fix buyer i; for each ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti, define Xiqtit′i as the
probability that buyer i is allocated q items when his real type is ti and the reported type is t
′
i;
Pitit′i is defined as buyer i’s expected payment when his real type is ti and reported type is t
′
i. For
each type vector t−i of other buyers, let zitit′i(t−i) =
µ(ti|t−i)
µ(t′i|t−i)
. We now simplify the value of Xiqtit′i .
Xiqtit′i =
∑
t−i
µ(t−i|ti)× xiq(t
′
i, t−i)
=
∑
t|t′i∈t
µ(t−i|ti)×µ(t)
µ(t−i|t′i)×fi(t
′
i)
× xiq(t)
=
∑
t|t′i∈t
µ(t|t−i)
µ(t′|t−i)
× µ(t)× xiq(t)
= 1fi(ti) ×
∑
t|t′i∈t
zitit′i(t−i)µ(t)xiq(t)
Note, buyer i’s type in t is t′i. Thus the problem reduces to checking the feasibility of following
constraints, denoted by EQ
fi(ti)Xiqtit′i =
∑
t|t′i∈t
zitit′i(t−i)µ(t)xiq(t) ∀i, q, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti
fi(ti)Pitit′i =
∑
t|t′i∈t
zitit′i(t−i)µ(t)pi(t) ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti
subject to constraints F(t) for all t, and:∑
qXiqtitivi(q, ti)− Pititi ≥
∑
qXiqtit′ivi,q(ti)− Pitit′i
∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti∑
i,ti∈Ti
fi(ti)Pitit′i ≥ R ∀i, ti ∈ Ti
As before, the implementation of Oracle(α, β) requires solving A(α, β), which for each vector
t = (ti, t−i) of types, maximizes:∑
i,q,t′i
αiqt′itizit′iti(t−i)xiq(t) +
∑
i,t′i
βit′itizit′iti(t−i)pi(t)
subject to constraints F(t). This problem can be solved optimally using a dynamic program just
as before.
Running Time: Note that the width ρ of the constraint EQ is linearly dependent upon maxi,ti,t′i∈Ti zitit′i(t−i),
denoted by zmax. The term zmax can be seen as the maximum ratio of conditional probabilities of
two different types for a buyer, when the type vector of other buyers is fixed.
23
Theorem B.1. For multi-unit auctions with budgeted buyers and correlated distributions, if for
any buyer i, conditioned of each type vector of other buyers t−i, if the ratio of maximum and
minimum probability of his two types is bounded by zmax, then there exists a polynomial (in zmax)
time algorithm to compute a feasible, ex-post rational, ǫ-BIC mechanism with expected revenue
OPT− ǫ.
C Budget Feasible Mechanisms
In this section, we illustrate our results for designing budget feasible mechanisms. We first describe
the setting: the auctioneer has a (hard) budget of B; we assume that B is an integer bounded by
L. There are n agents, and each agent produces a different type of item. Each agent is associated
with a private cost to produce the item; specifically, agent i’s cost of producing his item is ci(t)
where t is his type. The auctioneer’s valuation of set of items S is given by a G(S) =
∑
j∈S vj , i.e.,
linear in set S. The objective is to design a BIC mechanism that maximizes auctioneer’s expected
valuation of procured items such that (a) the auctioneer never pays more than B in any realization,
and (b) the mechanism is ex-post IR for each agent, i.e. if the item from agent i of type t is
procured, then he is paid at least ci(t). For simplicity in exposition, we assume {ci(ti)} are integers
in {0, 1, 2, . . . , L}.
Let t be the reported valuation vector. In the realization of the mechanism, let xi(t) denote
whether the item is procured from agent i, and pi(t) be the payment made to agent i. The allocation
and payments must be feasible for the following set of constraints, denoted by F(t):∑
i pi(t) ≤ B
xi(t)ci(ti) ≤ pi(t) ∀i
xi(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i
pi(t) ∈ [0, B] ∀i
Let Xiti be the probability that agent i’s item is procured when his type is ti; and Piti be the
expected payment made to him in this case. Let S(t) denote the set of agents whose items are
procured when the type vector is t. Let OPT be the auctioneer’s expected valuation of the procured
items. Then the problem reduces to checking feasibility of constraints:
fi(ti)Xiti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)xi(t) ∀i, j, ti ∈ Ti
fi(ti)Piti =
∑
t|ti∈t
µ(t)pi(t) ∀i, ti ∈ Ti∑
t
µ(t)
∑
i vixi(t) ≥ OPT
subject to constraints F(t) for all t and:
Piti − ci(ti)Xiti ≥ Pit′i − ci(ti)Xit′i ∀i, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti
As in Section 4, we require implementation ofOracle(α, β, γ) which involves solving A(α, β, γ),
where for each vector t of types, it computes:
Max
(∑
i
αitixi(t) +
∑
i
βitipi(t) + γ
∑
i
vixi(t)
)
(7)
subject to the constraints F(t). As earlier, αiti and βiti can be positive or negative, however γ is
always positive. We now illustrate a polynomial time algorithm to solve this problem. Recall, S(t)
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is the set of agents whose items are procured when the bid vector is t. Then for each i ∈ S(t), we
have
(a) βiti ≤ 0⇒ pi(t) = ci(ti), and
(b) If there is at least one agent i ∈ S(t) such that βiti ≥ 0, then there exists at most one agent
j = argmaxi∈S(t)βiti such that pj(t) > cj(tj), and then pj(t) = B−
∑
i∈S(t),i 6=j ci(ti); such an agent
can be seen as the winner in the allocation.
Clearly, if agent i is the winner of an allocation, then all agents j ∈ S(t) must have βjtj ≤ βiti .
The algorithm is as follows: We guess one agent as the winner; let i be that agent. Let Si =
{j|βjtj ≤ βiti}. The goal is to find a subset Q ⊆ Si with the following properties:
• i ∈ Q since we guess i as belonging to Q.
•
∑
j∈Q cj(tj) ≤ B, since Q must be budget feasible.
• Oracle =
∑
j∈Q,j 6=i
(
αjtj + (βjtj − βiti)cj(tj) + γvj
)
+ αiti + γvi +Bβiti is maximized.
This is now just a knapsack problem where the cj(tj) are item sizes; B is the knapsack capacity;
and the profit of item j is αjtj + (βjtj − βiti)cj(tj) + γvj . Since we assumed cj(tj) are integers in
{0, 1, 2, . . . , L}, this can be solved in time polynomial in n,L. Thus we get the following theorem.
Theorem C.1. When the auctioneer has additive valuation for the set of procured items, then there
exists a poly-time algorithm to compute an ex-post IR, ǫ-BIC mechanism with expected revenue
OPT − ǫ.
When the costs ci(t) are not integers, we can discretize them for the purpose of solving the
knapsack instance. This leads to a violation of the budget B by an additive amount ǫ, but otherwise
our result remains unchanged.
Our results also extends to the setting where the auctioneer is interested in procuringm = O(1)
items, and has arbitrary valuations G(S) on subsets S of items of constant size.
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